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ABSTRACT
In Model-Based Design of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS),
it is often desirable to develop several models of varying
fidelity. Models of different fidelity levels can enable mathe-
matical analysis of the model, control synthesis, faster simu-
lation etc. Furthermore, when (automatically or manually)
transitioning from a model to its implementation on an ac-
tual computational platform, then again two different ver-
sions of the same system are being developed. In all previous
cases, it is necessary to define a rigorous notion of confor-
mance between different models and between models and
their implementations. This paper argues that conformance
should be a measure of distance between systems. Albeit a
range of theoretical distance notions exists, a way to com-
pute such distances for industrial size systems and models
has not been proposed yet. This paper addresses exactly
this problem. A universal notion of conformance as close-
ness between systems is rigorously defined, and evidence is
presented that this implies a number of other application-
dependent conformance notions. An algorithm for detect-
ing that two systems are not conformant is then proposed,
which uses existing proven tools. A method is also proposed
to measure the degree of conformance between two systems.
The results are demonstrated on a range of models.
1. INTRODUCTION
In a typical Model-Based Design (MBD) process for Cyber-
Physical Systems (see Fig. 1), a series of models and imple-
mentations are iteratively developed such that the end prod-
uct satisfies a set of functional requirements Φ. Ideally, the
initial (simpler) model MS developed should have structural
properties that make it amenable to formal synthesis and
verification methods [40, 28] (cycle 1 in Fig. 1) through soft-
ware tools like [17, 35, 44, 22, 41, 34]. Then, the fidelity of
the models is increased by modeling more complex physical
phenomena ignored initially and by introducing inaccuracies
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Figure 1: Typical V process in MBD. (1) Verifying that the
simple model satisfies the functional requirements; (2) Es-
tablishing a relationship between the simple and complex
model; (3) Verifying conformance of implementation to the
model; (4) Verifying that the end product satisfies the func-
tional requirements.
due to the computational platforms such as look-up-tables,
time delays, 3rd party black-box components, etc.
The development of a higher fidelity model raises the obvi-
ous question of what is the relationship between the“simple”
MS and “complex” MC models developed (cycle 2 in Fig.
1). If the simpler model developed was a nondeterministic
model and the structure of MC was fully known, then the
answer to the question could be established through behav-
ioral inclusions [40], i.e., is it true that every behavior of MC
can be exhibited by MS , in response to the same stimulus?
However, in practice, non-deterministic models are rarely
utilized and supported by industry tools for MBD such as
LabViewTM or Simulink/StateflowTM . Instead, a hierar-
chy of deterministic models is developed each capturing a
more accurate representation of the final system, and it is
important to know how ‘close’ two successive models are
to each other. While the higher fidelity model introduces
new, more realistic behavior, it should still follow, roughly,
the behavior of MS . Thus, in lieu of behavioral inclusion,
an appropriate notion of distance between the models is re-
quired, i.e., dist(MC ,MS). This we call conformance be-
tween the simple and complex models. Such distance1 no-
tions have been developed for various classes of systems [40,
18, 7, 32, 21] over the years. Even though works such as [18,
1Note we don’t use the word ‘distance’ in the mathematical
sense.
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32] treat systems with hybrid dynamics directly, they apply
only to certain classes of hybrid systems and, most impor-
tantly, they rely on the full knowledge of the mathematical
model of both MS and MC . For industrial size CPS models,
such knowledge is not always available. Another limitation
is that existing distance measures for systems either consider
only distances in time, e.g., [21], or in space [18, 7, 32]. For
CPS, both are extremely important especially if the end goal
is to verify that the deployed system (SD) satisfies formal
specifications that involve timing requirements [26, 31].
The same observations hold for the important problem
of verifying whether a system SI , which is an implementa-
tion of a model MC , behaves approximately similar to its
model MC (arrows labeled with 3 in Fig. 1). Irrespective of
whether the automatic code generation process has formal
guarantees, rarely does the model MC capture accurately
all physical phenomena. Thus, the prototype system SI will
be manually modified and calibrated into a final deployment
SD. Then, the deployment SD should have a bounded, com-
putable distance from the model MC under an appropriate
metric, i.e., dist(MC , SD) ≤ ε, and, SD should satisfy the
set of specifications.
In this paper, a framework is provided to address the
aforementioned gaps in MBD for CPS, i.e., arrows 2 and 3
in the V process in Fig. 1. The framework is agnostic about
whether the systems studied are both models or a model
and its implementation, thus we will generically refer to one
system as the Model and to the other as its Implementation.
More specifically, we utilize hybrid distance measures sim-
ilar to [30, 37, 12] in order to define distances between system
behaviors. Given two system behaviors (or trajectories), we
compute a (τ, ε) distance between them that captures both
their distances in time and in space. Then, given a bound
(τ¯ , ε¯), we consider the problem of whether the Implementa-
tion conforms to its Model with degree (τ¯ , ε¯). We pose the
aforementioned problem as an optimization problem which
we solve using our tool S-Taliro [6, 14]. Our solution is a
best effort framework and the guarantees provided are of a
probabilistic nature as described for instance in [3, 5, 27].
Conformance testing versus specification checking.
One question naturally arises at this point: why not just
verify that the Implementation satisfies the same specifica-
tion that the Model has been verified to satisfy? The rea-
soning behind the question is that if Φ is all that matters,
it should be sufficient that the Implementation also satisfies
it. We may answer this question as follows:
1. It is not always possible to verify formally that the
Implementation satisfies the formal specification: for
example, a component purchased from a third party
might allow only limited observability and not lend
itself to formal methods.
2. Parts of the specification are not formally expressed.
For example, because the available formal tools can not
handle the size of the design (e.g. reachability tools for
nonlinear systems). Rather, the specification exists in
plain language Test Plan documents [23] or implicitly
in test suites.2
3. For a real-life CPS, much of the behavior is de facto
left unspecified because of the complexity. Once trig-
2Note the release of industrial tools that induce require-
ments from simulation traces, such as [8], in an effort to
formalize requirements currently implicit in tests.
gered, a particular behavior may exhibit unspecified
but undesired characteristics, even though it possesses
the specified, desired, characteristics (and none of the
specified, undesired characteristics).
Therefore, once we have an Implementation, it is not suf-
ficient to check that it too conforms to the specification (if
that is even possible). It is important to make sure that
behaviors exhibited by Model and Implementation are close
(in a sense to be defined). This then is conformance testing.
This way, both Model and Implementation display similar
unspecified characteristics, and our level of confidence in the
Implementation derives from our confidence in the Model.
1.1 Summary of contributions
In the previous sections, we have argued that current ways
of thinking about the relation between a Model and its Im-
plementation are not sufficient for the verification of complex
CPS. In the remainder of this paper,
1. We propose a universal definition of conformance be-
tween CPSs as a quantifiable closeness measure be-
tween the output behaviors of the two systems.
2. We argue that this universal notion implies most cus-
tom conformance notions which depend on the appli-
cation.
3. We pose conformance testing as a logic property falsi-
fication problem. We then apply existing tools to this
problem and show that they successsfully find non-
conformant behavior.
4. We show that conformance satisfies a monotonicity
property which allows us to search efficiently for the
best conformance degree between two systems.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In Section 1, it was argued that the verification of a CPS
implementation in an MBD process requires conformance
testing. The latter was described as checking that Model
and Implementation display ‘similar’ behaviors, where ‘sim-
ilar’ will be made precise. Because the objective is to detect
bugs caused by the implementation process, Model and Im-
plementation should be tested with the same inputs, and
starting from the same initial conditions. Our high level
goal is then to determine whether there exists a pair of (ini-
tial conditions, input signal) that causes the Model and its
Implementation to produce significantly different outputs;
and if such a pair exists, to find it and present it to the user
as a debug guide.
To make this goal precise, this section starts by presenting
the class of systems that we study. This class is illustrated
with a running example of a fuel control system for an auto-
motive application. Then, the conformance testing problem
is formally stated as a search problem over the set of initial
conditions and input signals. Finally, the constraints under
which we seek to solve this problem are presented. This lays
the groundwork for Section 3, where we will mathematically
define what it means for two CPSs to be conformant.
Notation. Given two sets A and B, BA denotes the set of
all functions from A to B. That is, for any f ∈ BA we have
f : A→ B. Given a cartesian set product A×B, prA is the
projection onto A, i.e. for all (a, b) ∈ A×B,prA((a, b)) = a.
2.1 System model and running example
At its most general, a CPS H may be thought of as an
input-output map. Specifically, let N = {1, 2, . . . , |N |} ⊂ N
be a finite set of integers, T > 0 be a positive real, H0 ⊂
Rnh be a set of initial operating conditions of the system,
U ⊂ Rnu be a compact set of input values, and let Y ⊂ Rny
be a set of output values.
Definition 2.1. A real-timed state sequence (real-TSS)
is a pair (y, σ) where y ∈ Y |N| and σ ∈ [0, T ]|N|.
A hybrid-timed state sequence (hybrid-TSS) is a pair
(y, σ) where y ∈ Y |N| and σ ∈ ([0, T ]× N)|N|.
When a statement applies to both real-timed and hybrid-
timed state sequences, we will simply say ‘timed state se-
quence’ (TSS). A TSS can be the result of a sampling process
or a numerical integration. Then the vector of ‘timestamps’
σ represents the sequence of sampling times, or times at
which a numerical solution is computed. A timed state se-
quence will also be referred to as a signal, and a Y -valued
timed state sequence will also be referred to as a trajec-
tory. The latter is standard dynamical systems theory ter-
minology. Note that a real-TSS may be viewed as a special
hybrid-TSS (y, σ) such that σ ∈ ([0, T ]× {1})|N|.
A CPS is modeled as a map between initial conditions
h0 ∈ H0 and input timed state sequences (u, µu) ∈ U |N| ×
T|N| := U to output timed state sequences (y, µy) ∈ Y |N| ×
T|N|, where T is either [0, T ] (for real-timed) or [0, T ] × N
(for hybrid-timed). Note that input and output signals must
either both be real-timed, or both be hybrid-timed. We
model discrete states as integers, so H,U and Y could be
hybrid spaces of the form X ×L with X ⊂ Rn and L finite.
The system H can then be viewed as a map:
H : (h0, u) ∈ H0 × U 7→ (y, σ) ∈ Y |N| × T|N| (1)
We impose the following restrictions on the systems that
we consider:
1. The output space Y must be equipped with a general-
ized metric d. See [5] for implications.
2. For every initial condition η0 ∈ H0 and input signal
u ∈ U, the system H produces an output signal. This
is imposed to avoid modeling issues where the Model’s
and/or Implementation’s equations have no solutions.
Further details on the necessity and implications of the afore-
mentioned assumptions can be found in [5].
As it is standard in systems theory, the system’s output
can be expressed as a function of its internal state η ∈ H ⊃
H0:
η ∈ H 7→ y = g(η) ∈ Y
Here, H is the state-space of the system. We do not al-
ways assume that the internal state is observable. Given
a real-timed state sequence (y, µ), its ith element is de-
noted (y, µ)i = (yi, µi) ∈ Y × T. Similarly, given a hybrid-
timed state sequence (y, σ), the ith element (y, σ)i is de-
noted (yi, σi), with σi = (t, j) ∈ [0, T ]× N.
Example 1. We consider a fuel control (FC) system for
an automotive application. Environmental concerns and gov-
ernment legislation require that the fuel economy be maxi-
mized and the rate of emissions (e.g., hydrocarbons, carbon
monoxide, and nitrogen oxides) be minimized. Control of au-
tomobile engine air-to-fuel (A/F) ratio is crucial to optimize
fuel economy and to minimize emissions. Ideal A/F levels
are given by the stoichiometric value, which is the optimal
A/F ratio to minimize both fuel consumption and emission
of pollutants. The purpose of the FC system is to maintain
the ratio of air-to-fuel (A/F) within a given range of the
stoichiometric value.
The scenario that we model involves an engine connected
to a dynamometer, which is a device that can control the
speed of the engine and measure the output torque. For our
experiment, the dynamometer maintains the engine at a con-
stant rotational velocity, as the engine is tested. There is
only one input to the model: the throttle position command
from the driver.
The conformance testing scenario for this example is unique,
in that the Model was derived from the Implementation, for
reasons on which we will now elaborate. The Implementa-
tion was derived from a textbook model of an engine control
system [20], and contains implementation details such as
look-up-tables (LUTs). The Model was then abstracted from
this Implementation for the purposes of formal analysis [24].
Despite the counter-intuitive relationship between the Model
and Implementation for this case, the conformance task re-
mains: to verify that these two versions satisfy some simi-
larity criterion. 4
The discussion and results in this paper apply to this
input-output map model of a CPS. To define some of the
conformance notions in this paper, it will be useful to some-
times work with the more specialized hybrid automaton model
of a CPS [30]: broadly speaking, a hybrid automaton has
countably many modes {`1, `2, . . .} := L, with possibly dif-
ferent dynamics F` active in each mode: η˙ = F`(η, u). The
automaton switches (or ‘jumps’) between modes whenever
the internal state η enters specific subsets G ⊂ H of the
state space, called switching guards. In general, a switching
guard might depend on time and on the current state; differ-
ent jumps ` → `′ will have different guards: G = G(e, t, η),
e = (`, `′). Finally, when the system switches modes, the in-
ternal state might be reset to a switch-specific value: η+ =
Re(η, e) if η ∈ G(e, t, η). If we explicitly model the system
mode as part of the internal state η = (x, `) ∈ X × L, we
may write the automaton’s equations as [36]
H
 (x˙,
˙`) = (F`(x, u), 0) (x, u) ∈ C × U
(x+, `+) = Re(e, x) (x, u) ∈ D × U
y = g(η)
(2)
where C ⊂ X is the ‘flow set’ of continuous evolution, and
D is the jump set, which equals the union of all guard sets.
Apart from the requirement that the dynamics have at least
one solution for every (η0, u), they are arbitrary.
Remark 2.1. The notion of a system mode applies to the
general input-output model of a system, so in what follows
we will often be referring to the ‘mode’ of the CPS without
necessarily requiring that it be modeled as a hybrid automa-
ton. For example, a powertrain Implementation might be
outputting the current gear, or the mode of operation e.g.
Economy vs. Sport.
The trajectories (or ‘solutions’) of purely continuous dy-
namical systems (with only one mode) are parameterized by
the time variable t, and those of purely discrete dynamical
systems (with no continuous evolutions) are parametrized by
the number of discrete jumps j. Following Goebel and Teel
[19], the trajectories to hybrid automata are parametrized
by both t and j, to reflect that both evolution mechanisms
are present. So we write η(t, j) for the state and y(t, j) for
the output of the automaton at time t and after j jumps,
or mode switches. Because jumps take 0 time, it is possible
to have the automaton go through several states in 0 time:
η(t, j) → η(t, j + 1) → η(t, j + 2) . . .. This can’t happen
in a physical Implementation, but it may be allowed in the
Model. We refer the reader to [19] for exact definitions of
discrete and hybrid time domains, arcs and trajectories.
We now introduce the behavior of a system which is ap-
plicable to both input-output maps and hybrid automata.
Definition 2.2 (Behavior). Take a system H, an ini-
tial point h0 ∈ H and input signal u. The behavior of the
CPS H from h0 and u, denoted BH(h0, u), consists of
• h0 = (x0, `0)
• the output trajectory yH(h0, u) generated by H in re-
sponse to (h0, u)
The behavior of H is then
BH = {(h,yH(h, u)) | h ∈ H0, u ∈ U}
Example 2 (Example 1 Continued). For the FC, the
outputs consist of the normalized air-to-fuel ratio λ and the
fuel commanded into the Cylinder-and-Exhaust. Thus Y =
R2+. The presence of a switch in the Throttle block, and an
LUT in the Cylinder-and-Exhaust block, induces 8 modes so
L = {1, . . . , 8}. The outputs of the FC are sampled at a fixed
rate. The output signals can be modeled as real-TSS. If we
could observe the mode changes during a simulation, then we
can use a counter j to count the mode switches, or ‘jumps’,
and model the output as a hybrid-TSS. E.g. the following
sequence of sampled (λ,mode)
(1, `1), (0.99, `1), (0.98, `2), (0.87, `2), (0.88, `1)
is interpreted as the following hybrid-TSS
(y, σ) = ((1, 0.99, 0.98, 0.87, 0.88),
((0, 0), (T/|N |, 0), (2T/|N |, 1), (3T/|N |, 1), (3T/|N |, 2))
Note that j counts the jumps so far, but does not indicate
what mode the system is in.
2.2 Conformance testing
Based on the preceding discussion, we adopt the premise
that conformance is a relation of similarity between the be-
haviors of two systems when subjected to the same stimu-
lus. The behavior is defined in Def. 2.2. So we may speak of
conformant (i.e., similar) behaviors, or conformant output
trajectories. Conformance testing can then be formulated
as a search problem: find a pair of trajectories, generated
by the two CPSs in response to the same initial condition
and input, that are not conformant. The search for a non-
conformant pair of trajectories is called falsification.
Problem 1 (Conformance testing). Let HM and HI
be a Model and Implementation of a CPS, respectively. Find
a pair θ = (η, u) ∈ H × U such that yHM (θ) and yHI (θ) are
non-conformant.
Because Implementations typically have limited observ-
ability, we assume testing happens under the following re-
striction:
Assumption 2.1 (Black box testing). The behaviors
of Model and Implementation are observable: i.e. it is al-
ways possible, for either system, to obtain an element of the
behavior by executing the system. Only the behavior of the
Implementation is observable - i.e. we know nothing else
about it.
In particular, the sequence of modes that Model and Im-
plementation go through can be an important variable to
track to decide whether the two systems conform. As an
example, a silicon microchip has ‘scan chains’, which are
chains of buffers that pass to the outside world the values
of internal registers. These are only used during testing,
and are burnt before customer delivery. In control systems,
mode estimation [10] could be used when applicable. While
we leave it possible that more is known about the Model,
we won’t need to know more to apply the methods of this
paper. More knowledge of the Model will make applicable
grey box testing methods such as [4, 2].
3. DEFINING CONFORMANCE
In general, conformance is an application-dependent no-
tion to help determine that the implementation process does
not use components or methods that alter the functionality
(or safety or performance) of the final product in any sig-
nificant manner. What ‘significant’ means will, naturally,
depend on the application. This makes conformance testing
itself application-dependent. Our first contribution is made
in this section: we present a notion of distance between out-
put trajectories, called (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness, and argue that
this is an appropriate universal notion of conformance; that
is, it is generally applicable regardless of the underlying ap-
plication. The price we pay for this universality is that this
notion is stronger than the application-dependent ones: two
systems may not be conformant according to (T, J, (τ, ε))-
closeness, but they may be conformant according to a weaker
custom notion which is sufficient for the task at hand. In
the second part of this section, we give real-life examples
where the application-dependent conformance turns out to
be implied by (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness.
Thus we may develop a general theory of conformance
based on (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness, and ‘generic’ algorithms that
decide conformance which do not depend on the applica-
tion. This is advantageous for two reasons: one of the chal-
lenges today for testing of hybrid systems (and CPS in gen-
eral) is to define conformance in a rigorous manner, and
(T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness provides an answer. Secondly, generic
conformance tools can be used early in the design cycle, be-
fore the instrumentation is all there for a deeper analysis of
the difference between Model and Implementation. More-
over, a feature of the universal notion is that it uses only
the outputs of the system (and possibly the mode sequence
if available). Thus, the analysis and methods herein are ap-
plicable to potentially complicated systems with very gen-
eral system models, including the input-output map model
in Section 2.1.
3.1 A universal conformance notion
The proposed universal notion of conformance is (T, J, (τ, ε))-
closeness. (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness expresses proximity between
the outputs, their time sequences (real-TSS and hybrid-
TSS), and their modes if applicable. It is derived from [19].
Definition 3.1 ((T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness). Take a test
duration T > 0, a maximum number of jumps J ∈ N, and
parameters τ, ε > 0. Two timed state sequences, or trajec-
tories, (y, σ) and (y′, σ′) are (T, J, (τ, ε))-close if
(a) for all i ∈ N such that σi = (t, j) satisfies t ≤ T, j ≤ J ,
there exists k ∈ N such that σ′k = (s, j), |t− s| < τ , and
‖yi − y′k‖ < ε
(b) for all i ∈ N such that σ′i = (t, j) satisfies t ≤ T, j ≤ J ,
there exists k ∈ N such that σk = (s, j), |t− s| < τ , and
‖y′i − yk‖ < ε
We will also say that y1 and y2 are conformant with degree
(T, J, (τ, ε)).
When T and J are clear from the context, we simply say
(τ, ε)-close. Because a real-TSS is a special case of a hybrid-
TSS, the above definition applies to both.
(T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness may be tought of as giving a prox-
imity measure between the two hybrid arcs, both in time
and space. The definition says that within any time win-
dow of size 2τ , there must be a time when the trajectories
are within ε or less of each other. Allowing some ‘wiggle
room’ in both time and space is important for conformance
testing: when implementing a Model, there are inevitable
errors. These are due to differences in computation preci-
sion, clock drift in the implementation, the use of inexpen-
sive components, unmodeled environmental conditions, etc,
leading to the Implementation’s output to differ in value
from the Model’s output, and to have different timing char-
acteristics. Thus (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness captures nicely the
intuitive notion that ‘the outputs should still look alike’.
Our definition of (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness differs slightly from
the original definition in [19] in that we use two ‘precision’
parameters τ and ε instead of one. In practice, using only
one precision parameter is too restrictive, since the outputs
can have a different order of magnitude from the time vari-
able. It can be verified that the hioco relation of Van Osch
[33] is an exact version of (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness (τ = ε = 0),
with the role of inputs and outputs explicitly differentiated.
Remark 3.1. If it is not possible to observe the number
of jumps j, then we simplify the above definition by assuming
that j is always equal to 1. In other words, we interpret the
definition over real-TSS and assume the system only has one
mode.
Definition 3.2. Take a test duration T > 0, a maxi-
mum number of jumps J ∈ N, and parameters τ, ε > 0.
Two CPSs HM and HI are said to be (T, J, (τ, ε))-close if
for any initial condition h0 ∈ H0 and input signal u ∈ U,
the trajectories yHM (h0, u) and yHI (h0, u) are (T, J, (τ, ε))-
close. The two systems are also said to be conformant with
degree (T, J, (τ, ε)).
Remark 3.2. A Model and Implementation generally won’t
have the same state-space, and so won’t accept the same ini-
tial conditions. So when we provide the same initial condi-
tion h0 to both, one of them might use a projection of h0
or a more general mapping f(h0) to obtain its appropriate
initial conditions.
From a conformance perspective, it is preferable to have
a smaller ε and a smaller τ . We use this to define a partial
order on the (τ, ε) pairs.
Definition 3.3. The partial order relation  over (τ, ε)
pairs is given by (τ, ε)  (τ ′, ε′) if and only if τ ≤ τ ′ and
ε ≤ ε′. The inequality is strict if and only if at least one of
the component-wise inequalities is strict.
Remark 3.3. (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness has the valuable ad-
vantage of being monotonic: if two trajectories are (T, J, (τ, ε))-
close, then they are (T, J, (τ ′, ε′))-close for any (τ ′, ε′) 
(τ, ε). This allows us to use a simple binary search for a
smallest (τ, ε) pair such that the trajectories, and the sys-
tems, are (T, J, (τ, ε))-close. We make use of this property
in the experiments.
3.2 Examples
We conclude this section with examples where application-
specific notions of conformance are implied by (T, J, (τ, ε))-
closeness. Thus if we find trajectory pairs (ηHM , ηHI ) that
violate the latter, they automatically violate the former.
Example 3 (Example 1 continued). Because the look-
up-tables (LUTs) in the Implementation HI are replaced by
polynomials in the Model HM , some error is expected be-
tween the outputs of the two systems. The designer hopes,
however, that the error at the output of the Implementation,
is in the same order of magnitude as the error between the
outputs of the LUTs and the outputs of the corresponding
polynomials. If not, then more entries are needed in the
LUT. Moreover because LUT look-ups are typically faster
than polynomial computations, some delay between the two
outputs is expected to be observed. The designer has a pre-
specified maximum acceptable delay. In this case, confor-
mance imposes upper bounds on the spatial and temporal
differences between the outputs of Model and Implemenation.
Conformance testing is applicable to application domain
areas other than the automotive industry. E.g. in the mi-
crochip design cycle, as shown in the following example.
Example 4 (State retention). HM is an RTL de-
scription of an electrical circuit, and HI is equal to HM
with power gating and state retention added to some of its
subsystems. With state retention, the contents of certain
critical memory elements of the power-gated subsystem are
retained in ‘shadow’ registers prior to power-down, and re-
stored after power-up. This creates a temporary difference
between the state of the non-state retained circuit (HM ) and
the state-retained circuit (HI). This difference lasts until
the reset sequence is completed. Thus in this case, confor-
mance means that a temporary difference in modes between
the two systems is allowed, but they must re-converge after
a pre-defined amount of time.
4. SOLUTION APPROACH
In this section, we present a general method for deter-
mining whether two systems are conformant or not. We
also provide a way to quantify the degree of conformance
between them.
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Figure 2: Parallel interconnection of Model and Implemen-
tation.
4.1 Conformance as falsification
Our approach is based on the observation that (T, J, (τ, ε))-
closeness can be expressed as a formal logical property de-
fined over the output timed state sequences of the parallel
interconnection of systems HM and HI . See Fig. 2. A
TSS of the interconnection system H|| is just the concate-
nation of the TSS of the component systems: (y||, σ||) =
((yM , σM ), (yI , σI)). If we can find a (parallel) TSS (or ‘tra-
jectory’) (y||, σ||) which falsifies the (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness prop-
erty, then by definition, the component trajectories are non-
conformant, and by extension, the systems HM and HI are
non-conformant. In what follows, we will use the terms
‘falsifying trajectory pairs’ and ‘non-conformant trajectory
pairs’ interchangeably.
The logic we use to express (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness is Metric
Temporal Logic (MTL) [26] (see Appendix for a review of
MTL). We first present the following construction for real-
TSS, then generalize it to hybrid-TSS.
Real-TSS: Fix τ > 0, ε > 0. Our goal is to express (τ, ε)-
closeness as an MTL formula. Let (yM , µM ) and (yI , µI)
be the outputs of Model and Implementation CPSs, respec-
tively, in response to the same initial conditions and input
signal. Because (τ, ε)-closeness requires comparing the cur-
rent value of yM to current, past and future values of yI
(over a window of width 2τ), we will create shifted versions
of yI . Given the symmetry of (τ, ε)-closeness, we will also
define shifted versions of yM . The amount of the shift will
depend on τ : how many samples of yI (yM ) fit within a
window of width 2τ?
The shifted versions are now defined. Recall that yM,i
is the ith sample in the TSS yM , and similarly for yI,i.
Consider the Model’s output: for each i ∈ N , compute
the largest k ≥ i such that |µM,i − µM,k| < τ . Define
m(τ, i) = k− i: this is the number of samples in the largest
window of duration less than τ starting at µi. Similarly, we
compute n(τ, i) for the Implementation TSS for every i ∈ N .
The numbers n and m could in general vary with i due to an
adaptive sampling period. Define m(τ) = min{m(τ, i), i ∈
N}. m(τ) is the smallest number of samples in a win-
dow of size less than τ anywhere in (yM , µM ). Assum-
ing that |µM | > 1, it comes that m(τ) < ∞.3 This con-
stitues the size of the shift (forward and backward) to ap-
ply to (yM , µM ). Similarly, define n(τ) for the Implemen-
tation. We may now define shifted versions of the out-
put trajectories via the discrete shift operator: for k ∈ Z,
3The case where m(τ) = ∞ occurs when the Model trajec-
tory yM is Zeno: i.e., when it contains an infinite number
of samples without advancing time. This can result from a
modeling artifact [25]. The condition |µM | > 1 effectively
says we have at least two different timesteps, and so the
trajectory is not initially Zeno.
Sk(yM , µM ) := (SkyM ,SkµM ), with
Sky = (yk+1,yk+2, . . . ,y|N|,y|N|, . . . ,y|N|︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
) (3)
Skµ = (µk+1, µk+2, . . . , µ|N|, µ|N| + T|N | , . . . , µ|N| +
kT
|N | )
when k > 0, and
Sky = (y1, . . . ,y1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
,y1,yk+2, . . . ,y|N|−k) (4)
Skµ = µ
when k < 0. Note that the filler values at both ends of
the shifted sequences Sky (3),(4) are obtained by constant
interpolation.
Recall Def. 3.1(a). This condition can be captured by
saying that at all i, there exists a k ∈ {−n(τ), . . . , n(τ)}
such that ‖yM,i−(SkyI)i‖ < ε. Analogously for Def. 3.1(b).
Now (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness may be expressed as the fol-
lowing MTL formula ϕ(τ,ε) (∨ is the logical OR operator, ∧
is the logical AND operator, and I is the temporal ‘Always
over the time interval I’ operator - see Appendix)
p1(τ, ε) =
n(τ)∨
k=−n(τ)
‖yM,i − (SkyI)i‖ < ε (5)
p2(τ, ε) =
m(τ)∨
k=−m(τ)
‖yI,i − (SkyM )i‖ < ε (6)
ϕ(τ,ε) := [0,T ](p1(τ, ε) ∧ p2(τ, ε)) (7)
Because (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness only requires that the two
signals be within ε of each other at least once in a window
of size 2τ , p1 and p2 use disjunction: it is sufficient for one
shifted comparison to be less than ε.
Hybrid-TSS: To define the MTL formula over hybrid-TSS,
we must break up each trajectory into segments, such that
there are no jumps within a segment. Specifically, consider
the hybrid-TSS (y, σ), with
σ = ((t1, j1), (t2, j2), . . . , (t|N|, j|N|))
Assume that there are only G unique values of j that appear
in σ, corresponding to G− 1 jumps. We divide the hybrid-
TSS into G segments g1, . . . , gG, such that j is constant over
a segment. Each segment can be viewed as a real-TSS. If we
apply this procedure to (yM , σM ) and (yI , σI), we get GM
Model segments {gMi }GMi=1 and GI Implementation segments
{gIi }GIi=1. Let G = max{GM , GI}. We can now apply the
above procedure to every pair (gMi , g
I
i ), with the important
difference that the shifted sequences Sky (3),(4) are filled
with an arbitrarily large value (or +∞), and not by constant
interpolation. This is to reflect that a comparison past the
jump point is not valid. This results in G formulae ϕi(τ,ε)
obtained via (7). The complete formula can now be written
Φ(τ,ε) =
∧
i
ϕi(τ,ε) (8)
Note there are other ways of defining the MTL formula
for hybrid-TSS that directly incorporate the jump counter
in the formula. Comparing these different methods is out-
side the scope of this paper. Unless otherwise indicated, all
the discussion that follows applies equally to the formula
obtained via (7) (for real-TSS) or (8) (for hybrid-TSS).
We can now use existing tools, like S-TaLiRo [6, 14],
to find a pair of trajectories (equivalently, a trajectory of
the parallel interconnection) which falsify ϕ(τ,ε). S-TaLiRo
uses, among others, Simulated Annealing (SA) to find fal-
sifying trajectories. If such a trajectory is not found, con-
vergence properties of SA imply that with probability ap-
proaching 1, the property is satisfied by the systems; equiv-
alently, that the two systems are indeed conformant.
We should stress at this point that the proposed method is
not specific to (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness. It is more widely ap-
plicable to any application-dependent conformance notion
that can be expressed as an MTL formula, including those
from the examples in Section 3. For example, for the case
when mode sequences are allowed to diverge for at most a
pre-defined duration D (Example 4), the conformance rela-
tion is expressed as: “For every initial condition h0 ∈ H0 and
every input signal u ∈ U, whenever the two systems are in
different modes, they will be back in the same mode within
D sec”. This can now be written as the MTL formula:
ϕPWC := [0,T−D](`(t) 6= `′(t)⇒ 3[0,D]`(t) = `′(t)) (9)
We conclude this section with a word on how to practi-
cally falsify ϕ(τ,ε) (or any of the other application-dependent
notions). A method that has proved efficient is to minimize
the robustness of the trajectories w.r.t the MTL property. In
this work, we use spatial robustness [5, 15] and time robust-
ness [13]. Spatial robustness measures how far in the output
space a given trajectory is from the nearest trajectory with
opposite truth value for ϕ.4 The spatial robustness of tra-
jectory (y, µ) starting at time t w.r.t. formula ϕ is denoted
as follows
[[ϕ]]((y, µ), t) = r ∈ R ∪ {±∞}
Computing r is done on the output trajectory without any
reference to the system that generated it.
Time robustness measures by how much to shift the given
trajectory in time, to change its truth value w.r.t. ϕ. Two
time robustness values may be measured for each trajec-
tory: the future robustness θ+ and the past robustness θ−,
depending on whether the signal is shifted left (so future val-
ues are introduced) or right (so past values are introduced).
In this work we explicitly denote time robustness by
[[ϕ]]θ((y, µ), t) = min{θ−, θ+} ∈ R ∪ {±∞}
The spatial [15] and temporal [13] robust semantics of MTL
formulae are reviewed in the appendix.
Both types of robustness (spatial and temporal) satisfy
the fundamental theorem that a negative robustness value
indicates falsification, a positive value indicates satisfaction,
and a value of 0 indicates that an infinitesimal change in the
trajectory (in space or in time) will change its truth value.
Therefore, the search for a falsifying trajectory y|| can be re-
cast as the problem of minimizing [[ϕ]](y||, 0) over H0×U|N|.
To make this a finite-dimensional optimization, the input
signals are parameterized with a finite number of param-
eters. (This parametrization effectively limits the search
space, and the global minimum returned by falsification is a
minimum over this limited space. But the parametrization
can typically be made as precise as desired, e.g. to within
4If the mode is observable, spatial robustness also computes
the (quasi-) distance between the modes of the two trajec-
tories [5], but we don’t make use of this here.
the approximation error of the minimization algorithm). As
our objective is to find falsifying trajectories, we stop the
search as soon as it encounters a trajectory with negative
robustness.
Now it is possible to create an example which displays a
(graphically) convergent sequence of trajectories (y||,i, µ||,i)→
(y||, µ||) such that [[ϕ(τ,ε)]]((y||,i, µ||,i), 0) does not converge
to [[ϕ(τ,ε)]]((y||, µ||), 0). This holds true for both spatial and
temporal robustness. So even if Model and Implementation
are not conformant (for a given value of (T, J, (τ, ε))), lo-
cal optimization algorithms can get trapped in local min-
ima with positive robustness. On the other hand, non-
conformant trajectory pairs will necessarily have negative
robustness, so that if a Model/Implementation pair is non-
conformant, all global minima of the robustness are nega-
tive, and correspond to non-conformant pairs of trajecto-
ries. Thus we need to use global optimizers, like Simulated
Annealing, Cross-Entropy [38] or other methods supported
by [6].
4.2 Degree of conformance
In addition to verifying whether two systems are (τ, ε)-
close for a given (τ, ε), we may find a smallest such pair
with the order defined in Def.3.3. Recall now that ϕ(τ,ε)
is monotonic in (τ, ε) (remark 3.3). The following theorem
shows that the robustness values are also monotonic in the
parameters τ, ε. The proof is in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1. Take two TSS (y, σ) and (y′, σ′), a test
duration T , a number of jumps J , and a time t ≤ T . Con-
sider the parallel concatenation
(y||, σ||) = ((y, σ), (y
′, σ′))
(i) Fix τ > 0. If 0 < ε1 ≤ ε2, then
[[ϕ(τ,ε1)]]((y||, σ||), t) ≤ [[ϕ(τ,ε2)]]((y||, σ||), t)
(ii) Now fix ε > 0. If 0 < τ1 ≤ τ2, then
[[ϕ(τ1,ε)]]θ((y||, σ||), t) ≤ [[ϕ(τ2,ε)]]θ((y||, σ||), t)
Therefore, we can combine S-TaLiRo with a binary search
over the values of τ and ε to find a smallest pair such that
ϕ(τ,ε) is satisfied. Because the order on (τ, ε) pairs is only
partial, binary search is applied to each component while
fixing the other, thus exploring the Pareto-optimal front
(e.g. [29]). Algorithm 1 shows the binary search for the
smallest ε given a τ . A search over τ can be done similarly
with obvious modifications. The initial εh can be found by
using an initial binary search that doubles some ε0 until
[[ϕ(τ,ε)]] > 0.
The value (τ¯ , ε¯) returned by this procedure gives a quanti-
tative measure of conformance between the two systems, and
allows the designer to make informed trade-offs between,
say, output accuracy of the Implementation, and its timing
characteristics.
Remark 4.1. For a given τ , the smallest ε such that two
trajectories (y, σ) and (y′, σ′) are (τ, ε)-close can be calcu-
lated as
εM (τ) = min
i∈N
max
|σ′
k
−σi|<τ
‖yi − y′k‖ (10)
εI(τ) = min
i∈N
max
|σ′
k
−σi|<τ
‖yk − y′i‖ (11)
ε(τ) = max{εM (τ), εI(τ)} (12)
Algorithm 1 Searching for a smallest ε given τ .
Require: Number of iterations K, parameter τ > 0, low
value εl = 0, high value εh > 0 such that [[ϕ(τ,εh)]] > 0.
for i = 0 to K − 1 do
ε = 0.5 ∗ (εh + εl)
Run S-TaLiRo to falsify ϕ(τ,ε).
if ([[ϕ(τ,ε)]] < 0) then
εl = ε
else
εh = ε;
end if
end for
return [εl, εh]
Similar definitions hold for the smallest τ given an ε. We
can minimize ε(τ) over the space of TSS to determine a
smallest (τ, ε∗(τ)) such that the two systems are (T, J, (τ, ε))-
closeness. The approach in Algorithm 1 has the advantage
of working not just for (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness, but any other,
application-dependent, notion of conformance.
5. EXPERIMENTS
We illustrate the proposed approach on three systems,
including a commercial high fidelity engine model. In all ex-
periments, we didn’t restrict the maximum number of jumps
J in a given trajectory; rather, the simulation ended only
when simulation time reached T . So below, we set J equal
to some appropriately large JM .
Example 5 (Example 1 continued). We use the FC
Model and Implementation from Example 1 to illustrate the
application of Algorithm 1 to find the tightest values of τ
and ε such that (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness is true. Because the
(τ, ε) pairs are partially ordered, we are looking for the Pareto-
optimal front. We decided to fix τ at 0.01, and do a search
over ε. To determine which value of ε to start the search
from, we computed the maximum relative error between the
outputs of the LUTs and the outputs of the corresponding
polynomials over a window of 85 seconds, using randomly
generated inputs. The maximum relative error was 0.4091.
Obviously, because the LUTs are deep in the system, we do
not expect the same relative error at their outputs as that
at the output of the entire system. However, this duplicates
the typical procedure for deciding how many entries to have
in an LUT: fewer levels consumes less memory and makes
for a faster computation, but causes greater error. So the
designer starts from a few entries and observes the output
of the system. If the error in the oputput is not acceptable,
entries are added to the LUT to provide a better approxima-
tion. And so on.
Figure 5 shows a close-up of the the output trajectories
from System and Implementation. Note that, as shown in
Fig. 4 for the Fuel output, the two trajectories don’t sim-
ply diverge and maintain one distance from each other, but
rather, they diverge for a period only to meet up again.
This interplay between time difference and space difference
is well-captured by (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness.
S-TaLiRo [6] was run at each iteration of the binary
search to falsify ϕ(0.01,ε). Algorithm 1 found an interval
ε ∈ [0.71752, 0.71832] over which the robustness varies be-
tween between −0.0029 and 0.027. That is, The two systems
are (85, JM , (0.01, ε))-close with ε ∈ [0.71752, 0.71832].
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Figure 5: Example 5. Close-up on the trajectories.
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Figure 6: Example 6. The output trajectories for the
SimuQuest and Automatic Transmission Engine models that
fail the (τ, ε)-closeness specification.
Example 6 (High fidelity engine model). Our sec-
ond experiment was performed on a Model and Implemen-
tation of an automatic transmission. The transmission has
one input (throttle angle), and two outputs: the speed of the
engine ω (RPM) and the speed of the vehicle v (MPH), i.e.,
y = [ω v]T . Here too, the goal is to find a smallest (τ, ε)
such that the two are systems are (τ, ε)-close. The Model
is a slightly modified version of the Automatic Transmission
model provided by Mathworks as a Simulink demo5. The
model is shown in Figure 3 right. It contains 69 blocks in-
cluding 2 integrators, 3 look-up tables, 3 2D look-up tables
and a Stateflow chart. The Stateflow chart contains two
concurrently executing Finite State Machines with 4 and 3
states, respectively.
The Implementation is the Enginuity model of a Port Fuel
Injected spark ignition engine from Simuquest [39] with 56
states and a large number of black box components. A overview
of the components of the model is shown in Figure 3 left.
It is significantly more complex than the Model, as it mod-
5Available at: http://www.mathworks.com/products/
simulink/demos.html
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Figure 3: Example 6. Left: SimuQuest Enginuity model components. Used with permission, ©SimuQuest[39]. Right:
Automatic Transmission Model.
Figure 4: Example 5. The Fuel output trajectories periodically separate from each other and converge again.
els the effects of combustion from first physics principles on
a cylinder-by-cylinder basis, while also including regression
models for particularly complex physical phenomena.
The initial conditions x0 are the initial RPM and the
initial vehicle speed, both of which must be 0. Therefore,
X0 = {[0 0]T }. This means the output trajectories depend
only on the input signal u. The throttle at each point in time
can take any value between 0 (fully closed) and 100 (fully
open). We remark that the system is deterministic, i.e., un-
der the same input u, we will always observe the same output
y. Test duration is set to T = 104secs.
In 31 iterations, binary search found an interval of [4.8833,
4.8834], over which the spatial robustness varies between -
0.00013 and 0.03. Thus the Model and Implementation are
(104, JM , (5e− 4, ε))-close with ε ∈ [4.8833, 4.8834]. In Fig-
ure 6 we present two output trajectories that fail the (τ, ε)-
closeness specification given the same input sequence.
Example 7. To illustrate the falsification of application-
dependent notions, we choose ϕPWC given by (9), and apply
it to the navigation benchmark Nav0 from [2]. Nav0 is a 4D
hybrid automaton with 16 modes. Its guard sets are catego-
rized as either ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’. Fifteen implemen-
tations are generated by varying the continuous dynamics in
each mode (resulting in Implementations Dyn1-Dyn9), and
varying the horizontal guards (resulting in Implementations
HG1-HG3) and vertical guards (resulting in Implementations
VG1-VG3). The variations are such that the difference be-
tween Nav0 and Dynk is smaller than the difference between
Nav0 and Dynk+1. Similarly, the difference between Nav0
and HGk is smaller than the difference between Nav0 and
HGk+1, and comparable to that between Nav0 and VGk.
We ran S-TaLiRo to minimize [[ϕPWC ]]θ, the temporal ro-
bustness of ϕPWC . Simulated Annealing (SA) was used as
optimizer. Since it is a stochastic algorithm, to collect statis-
tics, we ran 20 runs of 500 tests each, and each test lasts for
T = 20 seconds. D was set to 0.5. The results are presented
in Table 1. 12 out of the 15 implementations were falsified,
i.e. found to be non-conformant to the Model. Implementa-
tions HG1−3 are robustly conformant to the Model, as their
robustness was infinite: this means that modifying the hor-
izontal guards within the amounts prescribed by HG3 can
not affect PWC conformance. On the other hand, only one
test was sufficient to falsify ϕPWC with the vertical guard
modifications. This shows great sensitivity of the system to
the vertical guard conditions. This is useful design input, as
it tells the designers that they can trade-off horizontal guard
implementation accuracy for greater accuracy in implement-
ing the vertical guards.
6. RELATED WORK
Tretmans [42] defined Input-Output conformance (ioco)
as requiring that the Implementation never produces an out-
put that can not be produced by the specification, and it is
never the case that the Implementation fails to produce an
output when the specification requires one. Both Implemen-
tation and specification are modeled as (discrete) labeled
transition systems. Van Osch [33] later extended ioco to hy-
brid transition systems (HTS) by incorporating continuous-
time inputs. This hybrid ioco is not testable in practice
because the state space and transition relations of an HTS
are uncountable, and the test generation algorithm proposed
in [33] doesn’t contain a mechanism for judiciously choosing
Implementations Nb falsifying runs Avg nb of tests Avg robustness Avg falsification time
(out of 20) required for falsification
Dyn1 17 181.47 −∞ 153.12
Dyn2 13 119.3 −∞ 98.08,
Dyn3 18 141.77 −∞ 117.71
Dyn4 20 41,45 −∞ 33.12
Dyn5 20 31.65 −∞ 24.82
Dyn6 20 27.55 −∞ 21.71
Dyn7 20 11.6 −∞ 8.60
Dyn8 20 2.15 -0.081 1.59
Dyn9 20 1.15 −∞ 0.90
HG1 0 N/A +∞ N/A
HG2 0 N/A +∞ N/A
HG3 0 N/A +∞ N/A
VG1 20 1 −∞ 0.46
VG2 20 1 −∞ 0.47
VG3 20 1 −∞ 0.48
Table 1: Results of minimizing [[ϕPWC ]]θ using S-TaLiRo. For each Implementation, are given the number of runs that
showed it to be non-conforming to the Model (second column), the average number of tests (or trajectories) needed before
a falsifying trajectory is found (third column), the average robustness, and the average runtime until falsification. Average
quantities are taken over the 20 runs.
tests from the infinite set of possible tests.
Later work [43] also extends [42] by treating the Imple-
mentation as a black box that generates timed traces, and
representing the specification as a timed automaton. The
objective is to verify, for each trace generated by the Imple-
mentation, whether it satisfies the invariants of the specifica-
tion automaton. As such, this conformance notion does does
not address this paper’s goal of verifying ‘similarity’ between
an Implementation and its Model, which is a more compre-
hensive problem. The work by Brandl et al. [11] utilizes
(discrete) action systems [9] to provide a discrete view of
hybrid systems (a modeling formalism for CPS). Thus Tret-
mans’ ioco can be applied to the now-discrete system. This
method requires knowledge of the internal system structure,
which we do not assume in our work.
In [1], a distance between systems is also defined via a dis-
tance between trajectories. The closeness notion used there
can be shown to be weaker than (T, J, (τ, ε))-closeness, so
that proving two systems to be (T, J, (τ, ε))-close implies
they are close in the sense of [1]. In fact, (T, J, (τ, ε))-
closeness provides a continuum of closeness degrees between
the two extremes presented in [1].
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have defined conformance between a
Model and its Implementation as a degree of closeness be-
tween the outputs of the two systems. This notion is quan-
tifiable, thus allowing us to speak of degrees of conformance,
giving a richer picture of the relation between the two sys-
tems. It is also applicable to very general system mod-
els, which allows us to study the conformance of Models
to complex Implementations. This conformance was then
expressed as an MTL formula, allowing us to use existing
falsification tools to find non-conformant behavior of Model
and Implementation, if it exists.
Because a CPS will usually have several operating modes
with different dynamics, it will be interesting in future work
to explicitly incorporate the mode switching into the MTL
formulae. Finally, a more complete theory of conformance
should also account for different time domains between the
Model’s trajectories and the Implementation’s trajectories.
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APPENDIX
A. MTL ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we review the robust semantics of MTL
formulas. Details on the theory and algorithms are available
in our previous work [15, 16].
Definition A.1 (MTL Syntax). Let AP be the set of
atomic propositions and I be any non-empty interval of R+.
The set MTL of all well-formed MTL formulas is inductively
defined as ϕ ::= T | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕUIϕ, where p ∈ AP
and T is true.
We provide semantics that map an MTL formula ϕ and
an output trajectory (y, µ) of H to a value drawn from R ∪
{±∞}. For an atomic proposition p ∈ AP , the semantics
evaluated for (yi, µi) consists of the distance between yi and
the set O(p) labeling p. Intuitively, this distance represents
how robustly the point yi lies within (or is outside) the set
O(p). If this distance is zero, then the smallest perturbation
of the point yi can affect the outcome of yi ∈ O(p). We
denote the spatial robust valuation of the formula ϕ over the
trajectory (y, µ) at time t by [[ϕ,O]]((y, µ), t). Here t is such
that t = µi for some i ∈ N . The solution y always starts
from time µ1 = 0. Formally, [[·, ·]] : (MTL × P(H)AP ) →
(Y [0,T ] × [0, T ]→ R ∪ {±∞}).
Definition A.2 (Robust Semantics). Let pi = (y, µ)
be a real-TSS output of (1) and O ∈ P(H)AP , and let I be a
non-empty interval on the real line. Then the robust seman-
tics of any formula ϕ ∈ MTL with respect to pi is defined
as:
[[T,O]](pi, t) := +∞
[[p,O]](pi, t) :=Dist(pi(t),O(p))
[[¬ϕ1,O]](pi, t) :=− [[ϕ1,O]](pi, t)
[[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2,O]](pi, t) :=[[ϕ1,O]](pi, t) unionsq [[ϕ2,O]](pi, t)
[[ϕ1UIϕ2,O]](pi, t) :=
⊔
t′∈(t+[0,T ]I)
([[ϕ2,O]](pi, t′)u
ut≤t′′<t′ [[ϕ1,O]](pi, t′′)
where Dist(z, S) is the signed distance of z ∈ X from a set
S ⊆ X
Dist(z, S) :=
{ − inf{‖z − z′‖ | z′ ∈ S} if z 6∈ S
inf{‖z − z′‖ | z′ ∈ X\S} if z ∈ S
where t +[0,T ] I = {t′′ ∈ [0, T ] | ∃t′ ∈ I . t′′ = t + t′}, unionsq
and u stand for the supremum and infimum, respectively,
and sup ∅ := −∞ and inf ∅ := +∞. The semantics of the
other operators can be defined using the above basic opera-
tors. E.g., 3Iφ ≡ TUIφ and 2Iφ ≡ ¬3I¬φ.
It can be shown [15] that if the signal satisfies the property,
then its robustness is non-negative, and if the signal does not
satisfy the property, then its robustness is non-positive.
The time robust semantics differ from the above only in
the definition of the base case. Take t such that µi = t for
some i ∈ N . If we let p[t] denote the truth value of pii |= ϕ,
then
θ−(p, pi, t) := p[t] ·max{d ≥ 0 | d = µi − µk and
∀k ≤ q ≤ i, p[µq] = p[t]}
θ+(p, pi, t) := p[t] ·max{d ≥ 0 | d = µk − µi and
∀k ≥ q ≥ i, p[µq] = p[t]}
[[p]]θ(pi, t) = min{θ−, θ+}
The rest of the equations above follows through unchanged.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
We start by proving the result for real-TSS. The exten-
sion to hybrid-TSS will then follow immediately. So start
by considering that (y, µ) and (y′, µ′) are real-TSS, and for
convenience, we will use pi to denote their parallel concate-
nation (y||, σ||). Recall (5),(6), and the robust semantics of
MTL from Appendix A.
(i) Define dk = ‖yM,i − (SkyI)i‖, and the atomic propo-
sition akε := dk < ε. Equation (5) can be written as
p1(τ, ε) = ∨n(τ)k=−n(τ)akε
So it holds that
[[akε ]](pi, t) = Dist(dk, (−ε,+ε)) = ε− dk
Thus with ε1 ≤ ε2, [[akε1 ]](pi, t) ≤ [[akε2 ]](pi, t). By the robust
semantics,
[[p1(τ, ε1)]](pi, t) = max
k
{[[akε1 ]](pi, t)}
≤ max
k
{[[akε2 ]](pi, t)} = [[p1(τ, ε2)]](pi, t)
Similarly, we can show [[p2(τ, ε1)]](pi, t) ≤ [[p2(τ, ε2)]](pi, t).
Thus
[[ϕ(τ,ε1)]] = min{[[p1(τ, ε1)]](pi, t), [[p2(τ, ε1)]](pi, t)}
≤ min{[[p1(τ, ε2)]](pi, t), [[p2(τ, ε2)]](pi, t)} = [[ϕ(τ,ε2)]]
(ii) The time parameter τ controls the numbers n(τ) and
m(τ), i.e. the number of shifted versions of the signals that
must be created. See (5),(6). An increase in τ can only lead
to an increase in the number of shifted versions, i.e. m(τ)
and n(τ) are both non-decreasing in τ . Therefore m(τ1) ≤
m(τ2) and n(τ1) ≤ n(τ2). Then by the robust semantics,
[[p1(τ1, ε)]]θ(pi, t) = max{[[akε ]]θ(pi, t) | − n(τ1) ≤ k ≤ n(τ1)}
≤ max{[[akε ]]θ(pi, t) | − n(τ2) ≤ k ≤ n(τ2)}
= [[p1(τ2, ε)]]θ(pi, t)
since the maximization for τ2 is happening over a larger
set. Similarly, [[p2(τ1, ε)]]θ(pi, t) ≤ [[p2(τ2, ε)]]θ(pi, t). Finally,
[[ϕ(τ1,ε)]]θ(pi, t) ≤ [[ϕ(τ2,ε)]]θ(pi, t).
The extension to hybrid-TSS is straighforward: by (8),
[[Φ(τ,ε1)]](pi, t) = mini
[[ϕi(τ,ε1)]](pi, t)
≤ min
i
[[ϕi(τ,ε2)]](pi, t) = [[Φ(τ,ε1)]](pi, t)
and similarly
[[Φ(τ1,ε)]]θ(pi, t) ≤ [[Φ(τ2,ε)]]θ(pi, t)
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